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ABSTRACT 
 
Environmental taxation is different from many other forms of taxation as it is 
not only used to raise revenue but it is also able to marginally influence 
behaviour to protect and enhance the environment. It provides valuable 
market led mechanisms to help limit greenhouse gas emissions, encourage 
sustainable behaviour and improve environmental performance to address 
climate change.  The Post Paris (COP21) agreement provides a framework 
for global actions to address climate change and this sets the context for the 
discussion of environmental taxation. 
 
Environmental taxes have enormous potential to change carbon usage. In 
2012, the Coalition Government (2010-2015) opined that the definition of an 
environmental tax includes three principles, namely that the tax is explicitly 
linked to the government’s environmental objectives, that the primary 
objective of the tax is to encourage environmentally positive behaviour, and 
that the tax is structured in relation to environmental objectives, particularly 
the more polluting the behaviour the greater tax levied.1  The current 
Government has adopted and applied this definition. By way of contrast, the 
definitions of environmental taxation favoured by the Office for National 
Statistics (ONS) and the OECD, respectively, give a wider remit for 
environmental taxation and policy making and include, for instance, various 
transport taxes which, as will be seen, do not fall within the Government’s 
definition of an environmental tax. The Climate Change Levy, which is the 
focus of this article, was introduced as one of a series of new environmental 
taxes on business energy use in 2001. It is charged on electricity, gas 
liquefied petroleum gas and solid fuels used by business. 
 
Generally, environmental taxes are intended to increase investments in 
renewable technologies while reducing carbon emissions, but they are 
vulnerable to political influence and policy changes. Thus, the rationale for 
                                              
1 Janet E. Milne and Mikael Skou Andersen, “ Introduction to environmental taxation concepts 
and research” in Janet E. Milne and Mikael Skou Andersen, eds., Handbook of Research on 
Environmental Taxation Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014 pp.15-32. 
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environmental or ‘Green’ taxes has shifted perceptibly to raising revenue 
rather than enabling government to meet its obligations under the Climate 
Change Act 2008.  Environmental taxes are also susceptible to oil prices and 
fluctuations in the global economy. The North Sea oil and gas industry is 
going through a difficult period of retrenchment. A recent independent report 
has suggested that the industry has two years to adjust to changing economic 
circumstances.2 Inevitably, this will impact on the tax revenues raised from 
this sector. 
  
In an ideal world, environmental taxes should be easy to avoid through a 
change in behaviour and, consequently, hard to evade. Environmental taxes 
provide important means to achieve policy objectives, but their full potential 
requires public support and, especially, engagement by the business 
community.  The future of environmental taxes may depend on the success of 
‘green’ investment. There is a case for introducing a single climate tax on 
business. Undoubtedly, environmental taxes deserve greater attention in the 
economic toolbox to meet climate change commitments. The UK faces some 
difficult policy decisions under the Climate Change Act 2008 to meet the 2030 
energy and climate change package targets.3 Currently, the UK receives 7.5 
% of tax revenue from environmental taxes.4 To date, environmental taxation 
has had mixed outcomes in the UK, though few doubt its potential to define 
the future of carbon based energy use.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Environmental taxation is distinctive from other forms of taxation as it is 
intended to raise revenue as well as marginally influence behaviour to protect 
and enhance the environment. It applies a market led solution to reduce 
climate change through favouring low carbon technologies.5 Altering 
behaviour is not easily achieved and environmental taxation is subject to 
many socio-political influences. The desirable outcomes are often contested 
and to be effective their design, regulation and enforcement need to be 
carefully judged. The so-called “greening” of the tax system is favoured by 
many international organisations including the OECD and the European 
Environmental Agency (EEA). 
 
The underlying assumption is that the tax base should address 
environmentally harmful or polluting activities and favour environmentally 
beneficial or neutral activities. Increasing the share of environmental taxes in 
public revenues is a common aspiration with the intention of shifting the 
taxation of labour towards environmental taxation by 2020.6  The adjustment 
                                              
2  Price Waterhouse Coopers, North Sea Oil and Gas Industry London, 12th June 2016. 
3  House of Commons, Environmental Audit Committee: EU and UK Environmental Policy 3rd 
Report Session 2015-16 HC 537 paras 3-15. 
4 House of Commons, POSTbrief, Measuring Performance for the Carbon Budgets Number 
17 (January 2016). 
5 Janet E. Milne and Mikael Skou Andersen, eds., Handbook of Research on Environmental 
Taxation, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2014. 
6  HM Treasury, Reforming the business energy efficiency tax landscape, September, 2015. 
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in taxation from traditional sources, such as income to activities that may 
damage the environment is likely to be especially challenging when there are 
large budget deficits and constraints on public spending. Fluctuations in the 
global economy and in oil prices also add to the difficulties of ensuring 
consistent policy making. Many Western countries are no longer high users of 
energy intensive industrial processes that now reside, principally, in China 
and India. This has implications for the taxation base upon which 
environmental taxes are drawn. 
 
 The EU Commission has given strong support for increasing the application 
of environmental taxation.7 The EEA 8 has also favoured reforming 
environment taxation suggesting that Member States adopt the wider use of 
taxation to achieve environmental goals.9 An additional benefit is that 
environmental taxation facilitates international country comparison and 
measurements that provide an indication of country performance on energy 
usage relative to the economy and growth. 
 
A more coherent and integrated approach to taxation, including environmental 
taxes, is favoured in the findings of a review into UK taxation Tax by Design10 
published in 2011, which was chaired by Sir James Mirrlees.11  It is argued 
that in order to avoid short-term cyclical political change that it is necessary to 
integrate environmental taxation more fully into the UK taxation system. 
 
The Coalition Agreement entered into by the Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat parties in 2010 made a commitment “to increase the proportion of 
revenue raised from environmental taxation by the end of this Parliament.”  
This aspiration has been continued by the Conservative led government since 
2015 and remains so today. While policy makers may be encouraged towards 
environmental taxation, it is important to ensure that environmental taxation is 
coherent, and appropriately adjusted within the tax system as a whole. 
 
The Climate Change Levy is a tax on non-domestic use of energy which was 
introduced in April 2001.  It is a tax on electricity, gas, liquefied petroleum gas 
and solid fuels when supplied to business. Its main aim is to reduce energy 
demand and greenhouse gas emissions. The Levy required considerable 
negotiation with business to have it accepted, including a 0.3 % cut in 
employers’ national insurance contributions. The ensuing revenues had to be 
recycled into the corporate sector as employment tax refunds. This was a 
form of “earmarking” since the revenues were not used for a specific purpose 
other than mitigating the taxes imposed on the taxpayers paying the Levy. 
Earmarking is used to mean the practice of designating or dedicating specific 
                                              
7  EU Commission, Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe (COM(2011), 571/3). 
8 See, European Environment Agency, Environmental tax reform in Europe: Implications for 
income distribution (EEA Technical Report No 16/2011). 
9 EU Parliament Library Briefing, Environmental taxation in the EU Brussels EU Parliament 
2nd February 2011. 
10 Tax by Design Institute for Fiscal Studies, London, 2011. 
11 It is noteworthy that the Mirrlees Review does not consider the application of the Tobin Tax 
named after James Tobin who suggested a tax for currency transactions to dissuade short 
term currency speculation. See: for historical background and context: The Tobin Tax: recent 
developments, House of Commons Library, SN06184 (16th January 2012). 
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revenues raised from taxation to offset specified public expenditures and 
public services. Undoubtedly, the aspiration that prompted the levy was the 
mitigation of the socio-economic effects of an environmentally related tax. 
This is indicative of some of the problems relating to environmental taxation. 
More recently, adjustments to the Climate Change Levy12 are in train taking 
certain renewals out of an exemption for the tax. This underlines the 
susceptibility of environmental taxation to differing political policies when 
attempting to influence behaviour to reduce environmental pollution that may 
prove costly to business and industry. Trends in oil and fuel prices reveal 
broader weaknesses because of geo-political influences such as war in the 
Middle East and over-production of oil from OPEC countries lowering global 
oil prices. Slow-downs in major economies such as China may also have an 
impact on reducing demand for oil. It is also unclear if environmental taxes are 
regressive and more research is needed on the effectiveness of policy 
making. In February 2016, The House of Commons Treasury Committee 
expressed concern about the lack of clarity and stability on environmental 
taxation.13  
 
This article begins with a short history of environmental taxes, followed by an 
explanation of how environmental taxes are defined in the UK. The 
significance of the Climate Change Levy is assessed in terms of lessons 
gained and reforms proposed. This is followed by a discussion of carbon 
taxes and the growing importance of transport and other forms of energy –
taxes. Finally, the future of environmental tax is considered, including an 
assessment of its potential to change attitudes to protecting the environment. 
Since 1993, UK environmental taxes have been relatively stable and remain 
around 7.5% of total revenue from taxes and social contributions.14 
 
The History of Environmental Taxation 
 
Environmental taxation may be traced back to environmentalism in the 18th 
and 19th century and the protection of the environment as a means of 
preventing and ameliorating social evils.15 A.C. Pigou (1877- 1959) was 
influential in developing ideas associated with “economic welfare.”16 The 
principle that government action was favoured whenever it appeared that 
economic welfare should or might be increased. The Pigouvian principle of 
taxation is that the tax should be used to correct market externalities. This is 
intended to raise the marginal private costs to the level where it equals higher 
marginal costs. Consequently, environmental taxation offers a means to deter 
pollution. The tax takes into account the cost imposed by pollution on others 
and thus internalises external costs. Linked to Pigou’s analysis was a strong 
educational value, especially for business developments associated with 
                                              
12 House of Commons Library Briefing Paper: Climate Change Levy: renewable energy 
Number 07283 (26th August 2015). 
13 House of Commons Treasury Committee, Spending Review and Autumn Statement 2015 
6th Report of Sessions 2015-16 (HC 638). 
14 Office for National Statistics, Environmental Taxes 2014: London: Office for National 
Statistics, 2015. 
15 Boyd Hilton, The Age of Atonement 1785-1865, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986, p. 270. 
16 A.C.Pigou, The Economic of Welfare London: 1912. 
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economic growth. Pigou’s underlying philosophy was to impose a tax on 
companies based on the external costs they generated. This was intended to 
reimburse society for the external costs while internalising the cost within the 
company. So-called Pigouvian taxes give incentives to companies to look for 
ways of reducing their market externalities and, thereby, their tax liabilities.  
The benefits ensure that regulatory structures are in place within the company 
itself rather than having to be applied through external regulatory controls. 
This is seen as potentially beneficial to the way environmental regulation may 
work. Instead of complex external systems of regulation, environmental 
taxation may provide more effective solutions. 
 
Environmental taxes first appear in France in 1959 in water legislation as 
policy makers became interested in their potential to address pollution. In 
1971, environmental taxation was used to tackle effluent control in the 
Netherlands and Germany. Economists have led the way in developing 
environmental taxation especially in the US in the 1960s.17 In 1974, it was 
accepted in Japan to pay for victims of pollution. The experience of the US 
and Japan also showed how effective that taxation might be in curbing 
emissions. 
 
Environmental taxation has the potential to replace other forms of taxation, 
but this fundamental reform of the taxation system has been resisted. In 
recent years setting a price on carbon has attracted renewed interest and 
many international experts have argued for environmental taxes to be at the 
centre of tax reform.18 This means environmental taxes are closely linked to a 
variety of market based policy instruments, including the inverse, an 
environmental subsidy. Policy makers find market-based instruments such as 
pricing or quantity related taxes more beneficial than the traditional command 
control system of regulation and policy making. This makes a shift from 
prescription and bans that are often enforced by courts to incentives and 
negotiation to prevent and inhibit pollution. Economists largely dominate the 
literature on environmental taxes, but legal scholars have begun to recognise 
the significance of environmental taxation. This is partly because of legislation 
adopting environmental taxes, but also because there are various legal 
requirements that may become the subject of disputes in the courts. Legal 
principles of fairness and due process are relevant as are questions of 
standard setting and quality controls. The UK Supreme Court has held that 
the UK is in breach of the Air Quality Directive thus paving the way for its 
better application that will inevitably have to address the causes of air 
pollution in cities and towns.19 The question of how to address air pollution in 
cities and towns raises issues about congestion taxes and other mechanisms 
to prevent pollution. Diesel vehicles provide a major challenge in terms of 
nitrous oxide emissions and this makes environmental taxation particularly 
relevant today. 
                                              
17 Michael G Faure and Stefan E Weishaar, “The role of environmental taxation: economics 
and the law” in Janet E Milne and Mikael Skou Andersen, eds., Handbook of Research on 
Environmental Taxation Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, 2012 pp. 399-422. 
18 There is an Annual Global Conference on Environmental Taxation. 
19 R (On the application of Client Earth) v Secretary of State for the Environment Food and 
Rural Affairs [2015] UKSC 28. 
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Legal discourse is engaged in both policy making as well as the interpretation 
of various aspects of tax law. Exposing the choices and dilemmas facing 
environmental taxation is highly challenging. Environmental taxes are 
intended to fund public expenditure, but there are associated distributional 
burdens that have to be considered. There are important questions about 
whether or not environmental taxation is progressive, especially in the area of 
transport. 
 
Defining environmental taxation 
 
Four possible approaches to the definition of environmental taxation are 
evident. First, the OECD, along with Eurostat, defines environmental taxes 
according to their intent, namely to encourage pro-environmental outcomes. 
Eurostat offers a general definition of environmental taxes that relates to 
excise duties levied on environmentally harmful tax bases, such as energy 
products, transport, polluting activities and resource use. The aim is to 
influence consumers and producers through price incentives towards less 
environmentally harmful behaviour. The OECD has a generic definition that 
deems environmental taxes to mean “any compulsory... payment to general 
government levied on tax-bases deemed to be of particularly environmental 
relevance”.20  
  
The second approach is the one adopted by the UK’s Office for National 
Statistics (ONS). Broadly, this definition is similar to the definitions used by 
the OECD and Eurostat. It defines environmental taxes by reference to the 
effects of the taxation on pro-environmental outcomes: 
 
An environmental tax is defined as a tax whose base is a physical unit 
such as a litre of petrol, or a proxy for it, for instance a passenger flight 
that has a proven specific negative impact on the environment. By 
convention, in addition to pollution related taxes, all energy and 
transport taxes are classified as environmental taxes.21 
 
Under the ONS definition, environmental taxes include Fuel Duty, VAT on 
Fuel Duty, Renewable Energy Obligations, Vehicle Excise Duty and Air 
Passenger Duty. These are included in the UK’s annual budget report. There 
are several environmental taxes that have been abandoned or changed in the 
UK. The Gas Levy was introduced under the Gas Levy Act 1981, but was 
repealed by the Finance Act 1998. The Hydro-Benefit was introduced in 1991 
to protect consumers in remote areas from excessive charges resulting from 
the increased costs of supply. It was abolished in 2004, because it infringed 
EU law.  It was maintained for a limited time, thereafter, by Scottish and 
                                              
20 The OECD definition is available online and is cited in the IFS, The UK Tax System and the 
Environment (2006) p.1. 
21 See the Office for National Statistics, UK Environmental Accounts 2010, June 2010. This 
definition is also followed by the definition of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development. 
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Southern Energy.  There are many types of environmental tax and their 
diversity is one of their attractions.22 
 
The third approach, favoured by HM Treasury, is to consider the definition of 
environmental taxes by reference to a central question, namely what is the 
primary intention behind the taxation. Taxes that are primarily revenue raising 
are excluded from the definition of an environmental tax. There are three 
criteria to determine whether there is an environmental tax. They are: 
 
 The tax is linked to the Government’s environmental objectives; 
 The primary objective of the tax is to encourage environmentally positive 
behaviour; and 
 The tax is structured in relation to environmental objectives - for example 
the more polluting the behaviour the greater the tax levied. 
 
The weakness in these criteria is that they are directly linked to the policy 
making of the government of the day rather than any objective or independent 
assessment of pro-environmental outcomes or intent of the taxation. While 
this is a permissible interpretation of environmental taxation, it is at variance 
with the interpretation favoured in the first approach by the ONS and 
international organisations. Since the election of the Coalition Government in 
2010, there have been many pledges to ensure that environmental taxes are 
as large part of total revenue to 2015/16 as they were in 2010/11. 
 
In July 2012, the Coalition Government promised to “increase the proportion 
of tax revenue accounted for by environmental taxes.”23 as part of its promise 
to be “the greenest Government ever”. HM Treasury’s review of 
environmental taxes published in July 201224 identified five environmental 
taxes. This stance has been maintained today under the Conservative 
government elected in 2015. In the UK, environmental taxes are the Climate 
Change Levy (carbon price floor), the Aggregates Levy, the Landfill Tax, the 
EUETS, and the Carbon Reduction Commitment. Significantly, HM Treasury 
excluded fuel duty and air passenger duty which are included in the ONS, 
OECD and Eurostat definitions. 
 
 In contrast, the IFS proposes a fourth definition “ that reflects all those taxes 
which are environmental either in terms of intent or outcome for which there 
are revenue forecasts to 2015/16.”25 Unlike the HM Treasury definition, this 
definition includes the taxation of a company car which reflects the efficiency 
of the car, and VAT on fuel. 
 
                                              
22  For example, the rail franchise premia under the Railways Act 1993 and applied to the first 
franchises until 1996, boat licences as a means of regulating boat use, fishing licences from 
1995 onwards, the Aggregates Levy introduced in 2002 and which ensures the environmental 
impact of aggregates extraction, motor vehicles taxes (including excise duty paid by 
businesses/ households), and landfill taxes since 1996 according to the weight of the material 
deposited. 
23 HM Treasury, Budget 2011, HC 836 March 2011, paras: 1.110-1.111. 
24 The five are Landfill Tax, the Aggregates Levy, Climate Change Levy, the EU Emissions 
Trading System, and the  EUETS Carbon Reduction Commitment. 
25 See ENDS Report MPs call for environmental tax roadmap (10th February 2016). 
8 
 
The significance of the definition of an environmental tax is that it has a major 
effect on whether or not targets are met and the potential of environmental 
taxation is fully realised. The IFS has assessed how the different definitions 
may have remarkably different consequences. Using HM Treasury’s 
definition, the IFS has estimated that the Coalition Government’s pledge to 
ensure that the environmental tax share of tax revenue should double from 
0.4% to 0.9% by 2020. Significantly, it calculated that revenue from 
environmental taxes would fall between 2010 and 2015/16 by £3.3 billion 
namely 56% of tax receipts this fiscal year before the Government’s pledge  to 
increase environmental taxes made under the Coalition  Agreement is 
missed26. The exclusion of fuel duty is therefore significant in the calculation 
as it raised almost £27.8bn in 2015/16.27 By excluding fuel duties the pledge 
to raise duty in line with the RPI28  is harder to meet as the environmental tax 
share of tax revenue is set to fall by 0.8 % in 2015/16.29 The exclusion is 
politically motivated because, as discussed below, there are strong political 
pressures to reduce fuel duty in terms of public expectations of lower taxes. 
The exclusion of fuel duty makes the policy of reducing taxes easier to meet 
in line with the recent Autumn Statement in 2015 cancelling any rise in the 
fuel duty. This is likely to be the policy for some time to come. 
 
 
If the ONS definition is adopted, the proportion of revenues raised by 
environmental taxes will fall from 7.8% to 7.1 %. This would breach the pledge 
set by the Coalition Government and now the Conservative Government that 
revenue from environmental taxes should rise by 5% or £2.3bn.30 This has not 
happened.  
 
The definition of what to include as an environmental tax is largely a matter of 
political choice. The Coalition Government’s  Plan For Growth31 included the 
intention to move to a low-carbon economy fostered, in particular, by a 
£3billion capitalisation of the Green Investment Bank (soon to be privatised) to 
secure investment in a green infrastructure as well as a floor price for carbon 
for electricity generation from 1st April 2013. This remains the present position, 
but it may have to be adjusted if nuclear energy is to be taken into account. 
Linking environmental taxes to total revenues is not necessarily helpful. 
Setting targets is also subject to variable considerations that may ultimately 
reduce their credibility. The main consideration ought to be the improvement 
of the environment. The Mirrlees Review set high expectations that 
environmental taxes would be more fully integrated into taxation policy with 
greater clarity given to their role and purpose. It also sought to include fuel 
duty and related taxes within the definition of environmental taxation. HM 
Treasury has rejected this approach. 
                                              
26 Institute for Fiscal Studies, “A Defining issue? The Government’s pledge to raise the share 
of revenue from green taxes” London: IFS, 2012 ( 12th December 2012). 
27 See: Office for National Statistics, Environmental Taxes 2014 London: Office for National 
Statistics, 2015, pp. 1-4. 
28  Office for National Statistics op. cit. p. 4 
29  Offive for National Statistics op cit., p.2 
30 House of Commons Library Briefing Paper, CBF 7582, Energy Policy Overview ( 5th May 
2016). 
31 HM Treasury, Plan for Growth March, 2011. 
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The Climate Change Levy 
 
The Climate Change Levy (CCL) introduced in April 2001 is a tax on business 
energy use. It is one of the UK’s flagship environmental taxes.32 The 
inspiration for the CCL came from a HM Treasury report published in 
November 1998 which recognised that such a levy could act as an important 
economic instrument to improve the industrial use of energy by commercial 
and business enterprises.33 The CCL is charged on electricity, gas, liquefied 
petroleum gas and solid fuels when supplied to business. The domestic 
sector, including public transport, is exempted.  In addition, it is 
complemented by a system of Climate Change Agreements (CCAs) that 
incentivise energy intensive businesses with an allowance of an 80% 
reduction in the CCL where they agree to reduce emissions and increase 
energy efficiency. 
 
In order to make the CCL politically viable, the revenues from the CCL were 
recycled back to the corporate sector including commercial and business 
enterprises through employment tax refunds. The CCL required careful 
negotiation with business. Initially, it was supported by a 0.3% cut in 
employers’ national insurance contributions.  This combination of national 
insurance contribution reductions and the CCL was not planned to increase 
the burden on the business sector but to encourage efficiency in energy use.  
By 2006, the value of national insurance contribution reductions exceeded the 
receipts from the CCL. As a consequence, additional incentives were 
introduced to encourage industry and business. An Energy Efficiency Fund of 
£50 million was established through the Carbon Trust. The Trust has 
responsibility for the administration of various tax subsidies, including 
enhanced capital allowances to encourage investments in environmentally 
friendly energy equipment. 
 
The importance of the CCL is that it is charged on industrial and commercial 
use of electricity, coal, natural gas, and liquefied petroleum gas and that the 
tax varies with the type of fuel used. The original intention behind the tax was 
to help meet a domestic UK goal of a 20% reduction in carbon dioxide 
emissions between 1990 and 2010.34  During this period, a major influence 
was Lord Marshall‘s recommendation in the 1998 HM Treasury report that a 
downstream tax was desirable to increase “incentives” for the take-up of 
renewable sources of energy.35 This goal is important as it defined the 
rationale for the tax and acknowledged the important policy making role that 
environmental taxes perform. 
                                              
32 House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper  Number 07283 (26th August 2015)  
33 See, HM Treasury, Economic Instruments and the business use of energy: A report by Lord 
Marshall November 1998. At the time, Lord Marshall was Chairman of British Airways. 
34  House of Commons Library, Climate Change Levy SN/BT/235 ( 20th November 2009) and 
House of Commons Library, Climate Change Levy: Renewable Energy Number 07283 ( 26th 
August 2015). 
35 HC Deb 17th March 1998 cc 1108-1109 HM Treasury Budget Press Notice HMT 14 (17th 
March 1998). 
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 A brief history of CCL is as follows.36 In 1999, the then Labour government 
(1997-2010) took steps to ensure that the new CCL would be structured to 
reflect the energy content of fuels. Notably, the provision of electricity was 
treated according to the source of the generation of supply. However, 
electricity supplied from a renewable source was exempt. This exemption did 
not apply to energy generated from peat, fossil fuel or nuclear fuel. In 2005, 
this Government set an optimistic target with a planned reduction of 3.5 
million tonnes of carbon over the next five years to 2010. This was partly to be 
achieved through a reduction in demand for electricity in the commercial and 
public sectors. De-industrialisation was also seen as an important element in 
the reduction of carbon due to reductions in electricity usage. 
 
The importance of the exemption, in practice, was that it involved HM 
Revenue and Customs in overseeing the operation of the terms of a 
renewable source contract. The Office of the Gas and Electricity Markets 
(Ofgem) and the Northern Ireland Authority for Utility Regulation (NIAUR) 
have to certify that the renewable source electricity has been produced by an 
accredited generator. The process of certification is detailed and includes a 
Renewable Levy Exemption Certificate for each complete megawatt hour of 
renewable electricity produced. Details of the certificates issued are provided 
in the data set out by Ofgem. 
  
Recently, the incumbent Conservative Government decided to abolish this 
renewable exemption. This was unexpectedly announced in the Budget 
statement in 2015.There are transitional arrangements in place from 1st 
August 2015. The consequence of removing the exemption is to raise 
additional funding of £450m in 2015/16 which is expected to rise to £910m by 
2020/21. There are guidelines on the implications of the changes. One reason 
for the Government’s decision to abolish the exemption is that it was 
impossible to distinguish between renewables generated in the UK and those 
generated overseas. The Government’s position is that one third of the 
exemption went to overseas generators.  
 
Some of the energy generators have complained about the speed of this 
change and the absence of appropriate consultation. They have argued that 
there had not been sufficient time to take account of the change in policy and 
that it was illegal. They decided to take a judicial review against the 
Government complaining that the changes had been taken with insufficient 
warning. The Administrative Court37 rejected their case on the grounds that no 
express legitimate expectations or assurance had been given to the 
generators and that the public interest justified the Government’s action with 
the consequence that the Government’s policy should prevail over any private 
interest. 
 
                                              
36 The history is set out in some detail in the House of Commons Library, Climate Change 
Levy SN/BT/235 ( 20th November 2009) 
37 R (On the application of Drax Power and Infinis Energy Holdings v HM Treasury and HM 
Revenue and Customs [2016] EWHC 228 (10th February 2016). 
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The speed of implementation of these new arrangements for electricity clearly 
caught the industry by surprise, but it also highlights the vulnerability of tax 
planning and the difficulty of longer term strategic thinking. The implications of 
the abolition of the exemption are to make renewable electricity generators in 
effect pay a carbon tax. This also illustrates the difficulty of environmental 
taxes in general, namely that their rationale may be distorted by the need for 
government to raise additional revenue. 
 
The vulnerability of environmental taxes is an entirely political choice. In the 
current Government’s election manifesto in May 2015, it was promised that 
there would be no increase in the rates of VAT, Income Tax or National 
Insurance in the next Parliament. This has made other sources of taxes 
vulnerable to adjustment and with a view to enhancing their revenue yields. 
The 2016 IFS Green Budget (February, 2016) has predicted that the “ 
government’s plan to reach a fiscal surplus is predicated on tax receipts 
increasing by 1.1% of national income ( £21bn in today’s terms) between 
2015-16 and 2019-20.”38 Current estimates suggest that the CCL is forecast 
to raise over £2.3 bn in revenue in 2015/16 and this target is likely to be met.39  
 
Carbon and Energy Taxes 
 
The CCL has been subject to two major criticisms. First, it is poorly conceived 
and it would be efficacious to replace it with a carbon tax i.e. a tax on fossil 
fuels used especially by motor vehicles and intended to reduce emissions 
from carbon dioxide. Secondly, it has a disproportionate impact on 
manufacturing.  Both criticisms have some merit. The CCL does not vary 
directly with the carbon content of fuels. However, successive governments 
have shown reluctance in taking forward a carbon tax.  The economic and 
political sensitivities are such that this has proved too difficult to manage. In 
2005, the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) put forward a case for 
restructuring the CCL, which acknowledged that carbon dioxide emissions 
vary so considerably between the different fuels, particularly for coal and 
liquefied petroleum gas. The IPPR suggested a differential levy for different 
fuels.40 There is opposition to adopting a domestic energy tax on the ground 
that it will only exacerbate fuel poverty even when the revenue is recycled to 
increase welfare benefits. Pressure on the CCL has continued since 2005 
with opposition from some business sectors that have objected to perceived 
unnecessary tax burdens. 
 
There is strong support for a carbon tax in the analysis offered by the Mirrlees 
Review, especially when viewed in the broader context of developing 
international carbon taxes. Establishing a consistent price for greenhouse gas 
emissions is an area where environmental taxation might be developed 
further and made more effective. In environmental terms, the aim is to reduce 
                                              
38 IFS, IFS Green Budget 2016 London: Institute for Fiscal Studies, London 2016, p. 4 
39 Ibid., House of Commons Briefing Paper CBP 7582, Energy Policy Overview ( 5th May 
2016). 
40 IPPR, Lisa Hopkinson, The War on Motoring Myth or Reality, London: IPPR (August, 2012) 
p.25. 
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greenhouse gas emissions, thus making it more expensive to burn fossil fuels. 
This may in the short term lead to production cost increases with an inevitable 
reduction in output and the potential to create labour market shifts and 
unemployment. However, there are many gains to be made, including an 
impact on climate change. Pricing is the key factor, especially with the aim of 
reducing pollution. The IFS has estimated that: 
 
The economic cost of a given reduction in carbon emissions would be 
far lower if the reductions occurred wherever they were cheapest. This 
would happen almost automatically if policy simply taxed all carbon 
equally, regardless of where it came from or how it was used: the price 
increase would mean that polluting activity of marginal value would no 
longer be worthwhile and would cease (or shift to using alternative 
fuels), leaving only those activities for which burning fossil fuels was so 
important that it was worth bearing the higher price.41 
 
The CCL falls short of these ideals. There are wide variations in the emissions 
of carbon dioxide depending on the fuel used and whether it is within 
household or businesses. There is an absence of a coherent and consistent 
price for greenhouse emissions. Policy is often contradictory ranging from the 
EUETS, the CCL, the Renewables Obligations and even in the application of 
VAT. National taxation systems have to take account of international 
agreements and the globalised market makes any taxation system 
problematic. This must be acknowledged as a restraint on individual country 
initiatives. This is a long standing problem since the application of 
environmental taxes to energy following the agreements reached at the Earth 
Summit in Rio in 1992, which led, in turn, to the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change. Five years later, in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol provided 
binding commitments on countries to reduce emissions of the principal 
greenhouse gases. The Paris Agreement (COP 21) is likely to encourage 
carbon taxes and a greater use of environmental taxation.42 
 
In 2006, the Stern Review took matters to the next stage by providing an 
economic analysis of the costs of climate change. Whilst in the Mirrlees 
Review, Fullerton et al conclude: 
 
… it is difficult to imagine that any substantial reduction in the UK’s 
emissions can be achieved without according a significant role to 
energy pricing measures, in some form, whether through taxes or 
emissions trading.43 
 
They suggest that the most appropriate solution would be to set a price for 
fossil fuel usage, including one imposed generally on carbon fuels. Pricing is a 
complex and technical matter because as the authors suggest: 
 
                                              
41 IFS, IFS Green Budget 2012, London: IFS, 2012, p.175. 
42 Brookings Institute, COP21 Brookings Institute, New York, 2016. 
43  Don Fullerton, Andrew Leicester and Stephen Smith, Environmental Taxes chapter 5  pp. 
423-548 in Tax by Design  Institute for Fiscal Studies, London, 2011, p.450. 
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As with any other externality tax, the aim should be to ensure that 
private decisions that result – directly or indirectly – in additional 
greenhouse gas emissions take account of the costs imposed on the 
global climate.44 
 
Such environmental costs will be spread over a considerable time and are 
likely to include changes in sea-level and weather patterns characterised by 
storms, floods and droughts. Costs of population dislocation and potential 
social conflict have all to be considered. Ideally, it is concluded by Fullerton et 
al that a tax to control atmospheric emissions of carbon dioxide would be 
levied on individuals and enterprises. This might be best included within the 
existing EUETS established in 2005. Estimates can be made as to how such 
taxation might work. In 2006, permitted greenhouse gas emissions in the UK 
under the Kyoto Protocol were 652 tonnes, by 2015 these were reduced to 
607.9 million. The aim is to reduce the emissions by between 12.7 and 20% 
by 2020.45 Taxation in real terms might result in an aggregate revenue of 
about £13billion, a sizeable amount equivalent to 2.6% of total receipts from 
taxes and National Insurance Contributions.46 It is envisaged that allowances, 
that is amounts set off against tax, might be calculated in terms of residential 
reductions and related taxes and might have to be adjusted to take account of 
the new taxation arrangements. This might provide a powerful set of 
incentives to users to change their habits and adopt environmentally friendly 
options.  In summary, it is clear that energy taxes have the ability to affect 
behaviour, provide revenue streams and encourage the introduction of 
incentives for good practice. Pricing can promote cost effective strategies and 
this has the potential to encourage behaviour changes. 
 
The Environmental Audit Committee concluded: 
 
The UK has a complex mix of environmental taxes and price signals, 
particularly for energy. For example, there are now four carbon “tax 
points” in the electricity supply chain. And there are a multitude of 
different effective tax rates on carbon emissions that vary between 
different users of energy and different fuels. The Mirrlees review of the 
tax system concluded that there is a long way to go to achieve a 
consistent price for carbon and that the range of policies and emissions 
sources is so complex that it is hard to say what the effective carbon 
prices are.47 
 
Difficulties in addressing carbon emissions are also evident in pressure to 
reduce Fuel Duty rates.48 This is especially sensitive when fuel costs rise. 
When fuel costs fall, the problem is that the yield from the tax diminishes. 
                                              
44 Ibid., p. 431. 
45 Committee on Climate Change, Climate Change and the UK Emissions March, 2015. See 
the NAO, A Short Guide to the Department of Energy and Climate Change London: NAO, 
July 2015. 
46 Don Fullerton, Andrew Leicester and Stephen Smith, Environmental Taxes chapter 5  pp. 
423-548 in Tax by Design  Institute for Fiscal Studies, London, 2011, p. 460. 
47 Ibid., p.13 para. 21. 
48 H.M. Treasury, Budget Statement, 2011. 
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Having few tax incentives to switch to lower carbon transport alternatives, the 
long term environmental strategies may be muddled with short term tax 
reductions. The IFS Green Budget 2012, makes clear that there is a need for 
a coherent system of environmental taxes and that “the effective tax on 
carbon varies dramatically according to its source, and fuel duties are a poor 
substitute for road pricing.”49 Currently, the EUETS is of limited coverage. 
There are inconsistencies between it and the remit of national domestic taxes 
that cover the source of the emission as between variables such as the type 
of fuel used and the identity of users i.e. business or domestic. Reductions in 
levels of VAT on domestic fuels act as a distortion and effectively subsidise 
the creation of carbon emissions. The solution proposed is to find a way to tax 
emissions that are not within the current EUETS arrangements. One 
suggestion made by the Mirrlees Review is to make greater use of VAT. This 
has the disadvantage of arguably affecting poorer households 
disproportionally. Consideration of how to encourage policy making that 
successfully improves the energy efficiency of domestic housing and 
encourages improvements and efficiencies in fuel usage is important. Political 
policy making may well find this is a difficult task to address when public 
spending budgets are being cut and there is tight control over future spending. 
Another example is the related application of airport passenger duty related to 
airport usage.50 The lessons for policy makers are that environmental taxes 
are complex and, without government prioritisation, they may lack political 
acceptance. 
 
 
Transport taxes 
 
HM Treasury’s exclusion of transport taxes from its definition of environmental 
taxes fits uneasily with the ONS approach and the IFS definition that includes 
transport taxes. Improvements in the design of transport taxes have the 
potential to improve the environment as well as increase tax revenues. The 
UK economy has to bear considerable costs because of road congestion, 
including time lost for journeys taken and the expenditure on higher fuel costs. 
Transport taxes may take two forms – congestion charges and road taxes. 
Congestion charges attempt to tackle traffic congestion, air quality and the 
economy. Road taxes include fuel duties and vehicle excise duties, but there 
is no coherent system of motoring taxation, and this may result in 
unnecessary burdens on business and, ultimately, consumer costs. Falling 
fuel taxes, since the end of 2014, have reduced the amount of tax revenue 
raised, and fuel duty was frozen in 2013 initially, until 2015. This was 
extended in the 2016 Budget.51  
 
Congestion charges and road taxes 
 
The Mirrlees Review favours congestion charging as a priority and as an 
important means to achieve environmental goals, while at the same time 
                                              
49 IFS, IFS Green Budget February 2012, p. 168. 
50 ENDS Report 441 (October, 2011), p. 5.  
51 House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper: Petrol and Diesel Prices Number 04712 (17th 
March 2016). 
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considering that taxes relating to motoring and congestion charges should be 
related in a coherent way. Further, a recent Department of Transport study 
identified congestion as the largest cost to society.52  It estimated that 
congestion cost 12.3 p per kilometre mile compared to 1.6p for all other 
environmental and safety costs.  
 
In relation to transport taxes, Fullerton et al state: 
 
It is clear, however, that an optimal system of road transport taxes 
would require taxes that could be precisely targeted against the various 
externalities involved. In particular, road pricing should charge drivers 
according to the distance driven, location and time. If so, then prices 
would vary to take account of congestion and noise externalities, 
leaving fuel duties to capture environmental externalities.53 
 
Fullerton et al also raise doubts about whether any restructuring of the road 
transport tax system will result in any additional revenue, encourage motorists 
to change their behaviour, alter traffic patterns or ensure predictable gains for 
the environment. They argue, further, that the most appropriate measure is to 
consider congestion pricing, which is a very sophisticated form of congestion 
charging, as a viable alternative. This would involve complex road pricing 
schemes developed by economic modelling. They conclude that considerable 
benefits would come from this innovation.  Such a wholesale reform would 
require public support and careful monitoring. There would have to be a 
commensurate reduction in fuel duty to leave overall revenues unchanged. 
Underlying such reforms, of course, is the need for the political will to lead and 
implement change. 
 
To date, the experience of congestion charging has been patchy and 
indicative of party political division and extreme sensitivity to voter 
preferences.54 Following the Labour Government’s 1998 Transport White 
Paper,55 first, the Greater London Authority Act 1999 for London and, then, 
the Transport Act 2000 for the rest of England and Wales introduced powers 
for local road users to be charged. In the case of London, this power is 
exclusively delegated to the elected Mayor of London. In the case of the rest 
of England and Wales, the powers are vested in the Secretary of State in 
collaboration with local authorities.  Political parties are divided on the use of 
congestion powers and the then Conservative opposition in the 1990s were 
opposed to the enactment of new environmental taxes. Further, the Local 
Transport Act 2008 provides for how charging is to be implemented in London 
with oversight powers given to the Secretary of State over the equipment to 
be used and how the revenues from congestion charges should be raised. 
 
                                              
52 Department of Transport, An Introduction to the Department for Transport’s road 
congestion statistics London, Department of Transport, 2015. 
53 Ibid., Para. 5.6.6. pp. 484-5. 
54 See, Mark Bowler Smith and Huigenia Ostik, “Towards a classification of the Central 
London congestion charge as a tax” (2011) British Tax Review 487.  
55 DETR, A New deal for transport: better for everyone CM 3950 July 1998. 
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The London congestion charging system covers the London Low Emission 
Zone (LEZ). There are emission standards that limit the amount of emissions 
and gases and where vehicles do not meet the requisite levels there is a daily 
charge. Under Boris Johnson, who was elected Mayor in 2008, the LEZ, 
which was established by the previous Mayor, Ken Livingstone, has 
continued, but with concerns about its effectiveness. Over the years, various 
proposals to alter the parameters of LEZ have been put forward. Since 2008 
the charges have not been raised in line with the effective charging bands. 
 
The lessons from the operation of the LEZ are clear. In order to meet potential 
political opposition and voter rejection, the case for congestion charging 
needs to be more strongly advanced, especially in terms of consistency and 
coherence. The Mirrlees Review56 makes a strong case for making the pricing 
of environmental externalities a priority in the tax system and to provide a 
means of addressing the UK’s current, arbitrary and inconsistent pricing on 
emissions from different sources and a poorly targeted tax on fuel 
consumption. The solution lies in settling the externalities of environmental 
taxes giving an appropriate priority in the tax system: 
  
We remain some way short of having a coherent system of 
environmental taxes to address imperatives around climate change 
and congestion. The effective tax on carbon varies dramatically 
according to its source and fuel duty is a poor substitute for road 
pricing.57 
 
The case for taking forward congestion charging is a case in point where the 
benefits are likely to be beyond reductions in carbon emissions. In 2006, the 
Department of Transport proposed a variable road pricing scheme.58 The 
variables included place, time of day and so on. The aim was to reflect the 
actual congestion levels and costs. If such a scheme were advanced, there 
would be sensitive political issues surrounding the public’s acceptance of the 
tax. Even if there was some related reduction in fuel duty the true costs might 
prove excessive. This is a good example of relating consequences to policy 
making. 
 
Transport policy is strongly influenced by increasing demands on road use, 
linked to business and domestic usage. The importance of a transport policy 
is clear; its absence as a priority in Government policy making is a matter of 
regret. There are many reasons for thinking that settling the tax regime may 
yet achieve the desirable consequences of making transport policy a reality. 
There is also the question of electric car use and its encouragement by 
government policy over traditional fossil fuel engines. This is an inevitable and 
                                              
56 James Mirrlees, et al , “The Mirrlees Review: Conclusions and Recommendations for 
Reform”  (2011) Fiscal Studies vol. 32(3) pp. 331-359 at  p.340. Also see: The Coalition: Our 
Programme for Government May 2010. Also see DfT, Creating Growth, Cutting Carbon: 
Making Sustainable Local Transport Happen CM 7996 January 2011  
57   James Mirrlees, et al , “The Mirrlees Review: Conclusions and Recommendations for 
Reform”  (2011) Fiscal Studies vol. 32(3) pp. 331-359 at  p.340. 
58 Don Fullerton, Andrew Leicester and Stephen Smith, Environmental Taxes chapter 5,  pp. 
423-548 in Tax by Design  Institute for Fiscal Studies, London, 2011. 
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fast growing development that also needs to be incorporated into transport 
policy. Increasing reliance on electric cars feeds into the issue of electricity 
generation with profound consequences for energy policy. Less revenue may 
be raised through congestion charging if electric cars are given an advantage 
which may mean a drop in revenue.  At one level moving to a national road 
pricing scheme is an important benefit. It may also deepen our need for a 
coherent taxation policy. A holistic approach to environmental taxation rather 
than settling on a case by case basis is an essential aim. The question 
remains as to how best to achieve this within policy making, and, further, 
whether policy makers are capable of achieving this laudable aim?  
 
Road taxes include Fuel Duty and Vehicle Excise Duty. These duties 
generated a combined revenue of £33 billion in 2011. This amount has 
remained reasonably stable, for example, in 2014-15 when the revenue raised 
by Fuel Duty and Excise Duty amounted to £33.1 bn.59 This makes road taxes 
an important revenue stream, but ignores the overall costs to society in terms 
of congestion, road casualties, congestion costs, air pollution, greenhouse 
gas emissions and health matters. Fuel duty is a case in point. Using its 
definition of environmental taxes, the ONS estimates that Fuel Duty accounts 
for 65% of all revenue raised by environmental taxes.60  The Labour 
Government (1979-2010) introduced a Fuel Duty Escalator in 1993 based on 
2001 rates of vehicle excise duty which were calculated by reference to levels 
of carbon dioxide emitted by the vehicle. In 2011, the fuel duty escalator was 
renamed the fuel duty stabiliser61. In March 2016, it was frozen for the sixth 
year in succession because of the dramatic fall in oil prices to around $40 
barrel.  
 
Motor fuel 62 has been subject to various revenue raising taxes, including, at 
one time, the above-mentioned additional year on year escalator to ensure 
that taxation maintained a consistent revenue stream.63 This resulted in rising 
fuel costs that were exacerbated by global market forces in the supply of oil. 
The result was to see a limit on the amount the government could reasonably 
expect fuel consumers to pay. High fuel costs have the potential for distorting 
prices for food and other consumables as well as goods and services more 
generally with a direct impact on inflation and living standards across different 
income groups. Future policy shifts may include abolition of the Fuel Duty.64  
 
The failure of HM Treasury to regard Fuel Duty as an environmental tax 
because its original purpose was not to meet environmental objectives leaves 
the tax particularly vulnerable to the motoring lobby which complains of high 
fuel costs. Such complaint does not take into account the environmental 
significance of the duty in shaping consumer behaviour towards the use of 
public transport and the purchase of environmentally friendly vehicles. It is 
                                              
59 Institute for Fiscal Studies, Green Report 2015 London: IFS, 2015. 
60 ONS, Environmental Taxes-2014 London: Office for National Statistics, 2015 pp. 3-6. 
61 See: House of Commons library Briefing Paper: Petrol and Diesel Prices  04712 ( 17th 
March 2016). 
62  Zoe Smith, The Petrol Tax Debate IFS Briefing Note No. 8 July 2000. 
63  Loc cit. fn 59. 
64 HM Treasury, Budget 2016 London: HM Treasury, 2016. And see page 14 above  
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clear that counting Fuel Duty as an environmental tax, not only, will ensure 
that motoring is an important source of tax revenue, but also becomes a lever 
of behavioural change.  
 
Fullerton et al65 commented that the abolition of the Fuel Duty Escalator, its 
replacement in 2011 by a fuel duty stabiliser, followed by a freeze in duty for 
the sixth year in succession and consequent behavioural changes has 
resulted in a “decline in revenues relative to national income tax which is also 
due, in part, to the significant switch towards diesel fuel that has taken place 
in recent years.”66 This does not change the “UK pump price” of fuel which is 
one of the highest in the EU at about 10% more per litre than the EU 
average.67 
  
Environmental taxes also have the potential to distort the market as well as 
policy making. As Zoe Smith concluded in 2000, environmental taxes may 
also lead to a conflict of interests: 
 
The aims of the road fuel duty are conflicting. The propriety of 
demand for fuel that makes it difficult to reduce consumption through 
price rises makes it a good source of revenue for the Chancellor. If 
the government did succeed in getting people out of their cars and 
onto public transport, they would lose fuel as a valuable source of 
revenue.68 
 
Such potential for distortions in policy making needs to be appreciated in the 
political cycle and environmental taxes are susceptible to vagaries of electoral 
choices at election times or where government is unpopular. Careful research 
and analysis are needed to ensure that one benefit is not outweighed by 
another. Calculating the potential benefits and detriments of environmental 
taxation is essential for the future. Energy and carbon use is another good 
example of this conundrum. Poorer housing is inevitably less efficient in 
energy use. Consequently, the revenue yield from energy taxes has to take 
account of the proportionate costs on different households. Such distortions 
make the tax difficult in terms of settling the correct level. Richer and poorer 
households need to be treated differentially;69 a factor that through an 
inevitable element of progressivity can only add to complexity. 
 
Another important source of revenue linked to the environment is the Vehicle 
Excise Duty. This is based on an annual per-vehicle tax variable according to 
age and size of the vehicle, and from 2001, carbon emissions of vehicles. 
There are also tax reductions for alternative fuels. The overall aim is to 
encourage consumers to purchase less polluting vehicles. There is no settled 
                                              
65 Don Fullerton, Andrew Leicester and Stephen Smith, Environmental Taxes chapter 5  pp. 
423-548 in Tax by Design  Institute for Fiscal Studies, London, 2011. 
66 Ibid., p.471. 
67 Office for National Statistics, Environmental Taxes 2014, pp. 2-4. London: Office for 
National Statistics , 2015. 
68 Ibid., fn. 43, p. 8. 
69 A.L. Bovemberg and L.H. Goulder, “Environmental Taxation and Regulation” in A.J. 
Auerbach and M.Feldsten, eds., Handbook of Public Economics vol. 3 Amsterdam: Elsevier, 
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view on how polluting the alternatives are and this is likely to discourage 
strong policy making by government.  
 
Transport taxes are also a good example of the efforts required by the 
Government to convince the public of the advisability of taxation with a strong 
recognition of the environmental benefits that might accrue. The recent IPPR 
paper has made a number of key observations about fuel costs. The most 
important is that “planned annual increases in motoring taxes should be part 
of a rational government policy designed to change behaviour and raise much 
needed revenue to fund sustainable transport measures.”70 
 
 
The Future of Environmental Taxes in the UK 
 
Environmental taxation may offer an alternative to the much criticised 
command and control form of regulation and offers a wider range of regulatory 
techniques. There are practical as well as theoretical considerations.  In 
practical terms, the Finance (No 2) Act 2015 prevents Income Tax, VAT and 
National Insurance Contributions from rising above their current rates. This 
offers environmental taxation as a means of taking forward the raising of tax 
revenue as well as protecting the environment. At a theoretical level, the 
analysis offered by Don Fullerton, Andrew Leicester and Stephen Smith 
(Fullerton et al) in the environmental studies chapters71 of the research part of 
the Mirrlees Review makes a convincing case for the use of environmental 
taxation as opposed to conventional regulation based on the cost-
effectiveness of various economic instruments. This is examined through the 
advantages and disadvantages of each approach. The main advantages of 
taxation are that it may provide incentives for innovation and it gives polluters 
an incentive to reduce pollution and, thereby, costs. Further, as the tax may 
apply to each unit of residual emissions, this creates an incentive to develop 
new technologies. Regulation seeks to achieve the same outcome, but, often, 
fails to encourage continued reductions and there is an incentive to bargain 
with the regulators on a case by case basis. Regulators are dependent on 
information and data from firms, especially about abatement costs. Dialogue 
and negotiation may invariably occur with a form of plea bargaining between 
the regulator and the industry. Extracting reduced prices from regulators for 
compliance agreements is not unusual. Examples abound over utility pricing 
or licensing agreements. In contrast, taxation has the advantage of seeking a 
cost-effective distribution of abatement without bargaining conditions. Case by 
case consideration of each taxpayer is not required with the result that there is 
potential for greater fairness as all taxpayers face the same tax on their 
pollution. Implicit in the claimed for advantages of taxation is the idea that the 
risk of individual negotiation and the erosion of environmental protection is 
reduced, but it should be noted that there is the possibility of negotiated 
settlements between HMRC and taxpayers. 
 
                                              
70 Lisa Hopkinson, The War on Motoring Myth or Reality, London: IPPR (August, 2012) p.25. 
71 Don Fullerton, Andrew Leicester and Stephen Smith, Environmental Taxes chapter 5,  pp. 
423-548 in Tax by Design  Institute for Fiscal Studies, London, 2011. 
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Finally, conventional regulation may not be effective in raising revenue. This 
gives environmental taxation an obvious attraction in times of fiscal 
uncertainty. However, this may not always be decisive. The predictability of 
tax revenues being raised also has to be factored into the assessment. 
Revenue is always dependent on behavioural responses and changing 
cultural attitudes. Political choices are often overshadowed by election 
contests and voter choices. In respect of the environment, behaviour may be 
minimally influenced by taxation strategies as there are demands on energy 
and transport usage that are non-optional. This may vary from location to 
location and reflect local/central relations more than a desire to protect or 
enhance the environment. Environmental taxation may be limited in its ability 
to change or influence behaviour. Taxation may simply be passed on to third 
parties through pricing or other market mechanisms. This may dilute its 
effects.  
 
Collectively and generally, environmental taxation and other assorted 
economic instruments have drawbacks and shortcomings that also need to be 
considered. For many reasons, uniform pollution taxes may themselves be a 
result of inefficiency in identifying the sources of pollution effectively enough. 
Source-by-source taxation may not be adequate and lead to market 
distortions because the taxation system replicates market problems of hidden 
cross subsidies. The taxation system may be ineffective because the market 
is distorted. This can be remedied, in part, by tailoring taxation to meet the 
problem of differential sources and users. For example, domestic users might 
be treated separately from business users; rural and city communities may 
also be differentiated and, similarly, vulnerable groups from others. The 
operation of differential tax rates can result in effective outcomes. There are 
many variables, however, and it is often difficult to predict outcomes. Lobbying 
is also likely to be keenly felt, especially bargaining between parties and 
individuals with government. 
 
Environmental taxes also require some degree of integration with the 
corporate frameworks that they apply to. The avoidance of over complication 
is essential and there is a need to ensure, for example, that larger enterprises 
are in a position to achieve overall control and guidance over their local 
subsidiaries or branches.  This is a problem in terms of overall corporate 
governance and responsibility. The internal organisation in many local 
enterprises has to be able to accommodate general guidance from the 
“parent”. Small enterprises have also to be such as to introduce marginal cost 
abatement of the pollution. Careful consideration has to be given to the 
internal management of firms and their ability to address abatement costs and 
to ensure that appropriate and effective measures are in place, for example, 
policies on ensuring that the environment is brought to the attention of groups 
for example, recycling or reuse. 
 
Environmental taxation is also subject to adverse consequences if those 
subject to the tax are able to respond in a more damaging way. Waste 
taxation is a classic example where illegal dumping, which is difficult to 
prevent and regulate, can be the result. As a consequence, there is a loss of 
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revenue and a failure to protect the environment that leads to greater social 
and economic cost through the need for detection and clean up. 
 
There is also a concern that, in general, taxation has a retributive effect. The 
burdens on the less advantaged may be disproportionately large when 
compared to the wealthy. This distributional effect is applicable to 
environmental taxation as surely as it is to any other taxation. It is also a 
matter of national concern as additional burdens claimed by industry 
increases the unit cost of production and impact on UK competitiveness. 
These are familiar arguments in the analysis of any taxation system and 
should be factored into the discussion of environmental taxation. 
 
In weighing up the arguments for and against environmental taxation there 
are some additional factors such as administration and enforcement costs that 
have to be considered. A pollution tax may require the measurement of 
emissions and making these accurate is important both for monitoring and 
enforcement. In general, a tax can be readily imposed upon any market 
transaction such as the sale of a final good or service. An environmental tax is 
different. There are no ready market transactions for emissions, pollution and 
deforestation or dumping. Monitoring is difficult and often impossible to verify 
as it involves self-reporting. It often involves verification, inspection and 
monitoring and may be challenging.  On the other hand, it is important that 
any driver to change behaviour and address environmental problems in the 
form of environmental taxation is an important element in future planning.   
 
Assessing the use of environmental taxes is a matter of setting priorities and 
ensuring that revenue, as well as behavioural changes, is calibrated. 
Environmental taxes are perhaps at their most helpful in changing behaviour. 
The costs of direct regulation are much larger than taxation potentially making 
regulation relatively more expensive. Tax rates, however, need to be finely 
adjusted when applied in relation to polluting substances. Fine tuning and 
careful calculation of tax incentives is needed if environmental taxation is to 
make a difference. 
 
There is also considerable literature on the potential for environmental taxes 
to create unintended distortions within tax systems that often enhance pre-
existing distortions. Unintended consequences may include increased 
production costs that might be passed on through consumer prices, lowering 
the net wage of households. There may also be consequences for labour 
retention and company investment strategies. 
 
The Mirrlees Review has two specific recommendations relevant to 
environmental taxes. First, it recommended that a consistent price on carbon 
emissions is introduced through a combination of extended coverage of the 
EUETS and a consistent tax on other emission sources. This would include a 
tax on domestic gas consumption. The latter is hard to implement because of 
the escalating political problems caused by higher energy costs. The second 
recommendation is that the current tax on petrol and diesel might be replaced 
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with a national system of congestion charging.72  Again, this may prove 
politically difficult to achieve. Both recommendations have to be viewed within 
the broader agenda which is to take the UK towards a progressive neutral tax 
system, although there is some room for negotiation in terms of 
implementation: 
 
Where there is a strong case for deviating from neutrality – as where 
environmental externalities exist – such departures need to be much 
better designed and more clearly focused in the externality created 
than at present. This should involve consistent pricing of carbon and 
charges for motorists that reflect the main externality they cause, ie 
congestion.73 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Environmental taxes are an important element in tackling climate change.  
Under the Climate Change Act 2008, the UK is pledged in 2050 to reduce 
carbon emission by at least 80% from 1990 levels. Various caps in terms of 
Carbon Budgets have been introduced up to 2027. Environmental taxation 
has an important part to play in achieving such goals. Using the Government’s 
own definition of environmental taxes, in 2014/15, UK environmental taxes 
were equivalent to 2.5% of GDP which is slightly above the EU average of 
2.4%. In 2014/15, 72.9 % of all income from environmental taxes came from 
energy taxes, underlining the importance of energy in the taxation system. 
Transport taxes mainly consist of taxes relating to the ownership and use of 
motor vehicles. In total, transport taxes contributed to 23.7% of all 
environmental tax revenue. Motor vehicles contributed 47.6% of total 
transport taxes in 2014. Businesses contributed 50% of total environmental 
revenue amounting to £20.8 bn. Manufacturing was the largest contributor, 
followed by transportation and storage. Households have also been a 
contributor of £20.4 bn. 
  
The CCL falls short of being a carbon tax and is, in effect, an energy tax, but, 
as indicated, the tax rate does not vary directly with the carbon content of 
fuels. In its own terms, it has made a contribution to achieving the UK climate 
change targets. Estimates vary but savings of 12.8 million tonnes of carbon 
dioxide are calculated to have been made between 2001 from 201074. In that 
respect, this is a reduction of 20% in carbon emissions. The CCL is forecast 
to raise £2.3 bn in 2015/16. The CCL may also prove to have been a more 
effective form of regulation than other forms of traditional regulation. Its critics 
suggest that it might have an adverse effect on business and industry, 
although this is hard to quantify or prove.  
                                              
72 See: Mark Bowler Smith and Huigenia Ostik, “ Towards a Classification of the Central 
London Congestion Charge as a Tax [2011] BTR 487 re the Central London congestion 
charge, in particular, the charge’s revenue raising capacity especially. p.500.  
73 James Mirrlees, et al , “The Mirrlees Review: Conclusions and Recommendations for 
Reform”  (2011) Fiscal Studies vol. 32(3) pp. 331-359 at p.353. 
74 House of Commons Library Briefing Paper, 07283 Climate Change Levy: renewable energy 
(26th August 2015). 
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The present Government’s policy to reverse the exemption on qualifying 
renewables, such as electricity that is not generated from peat, fossil fuel and 
nuclear fuel, is an important policy shift. This is illustrative of how political 
sensibilities may influence policy. 
 
There are some anomalies in the UK system of environmental taxation. HM 
Treasury’s decision to exclude transport taxes from environmental taxes is out 
of line with the ONS approach and is inconsistent with the present 
Government’s claim to be the “greenest government “on record. There is a 
strong case for defining transport taxes within environmental taxation.  This is 
a reflection of their potential, as within the UK, they provide, currently, a 
greater share of tax revenue as part of GDP than the OECD average for the 
leading industrial countries.  Although, the UK is in the middle range when tax 
revenue from environmental taxes, is compared to EU Member States. The 
bulk of the revenue from environmental taxation in the UK comes from the 
taxation related to climate change and transportation.75 A recent IFS report 
makes the point that the UK is “some way short of having a coherent system 
of environmental taxes to address imperatives around climate change and 
congestion”.76 There is considerable potential for the UK to increase both total 
revenues and GDP in environmental taxes.77  
 
There are strong political messages that attach to most forms of taxation, but 
environmental taxation has the potential to achieve sustainable environmental 
policies and to encourage good practice as well as income receipts. The need 
to raise revenue is greatest at times of financial downturns and the necessity 
to encourage sensible energy policies. It has been seen how environmental 
taxes are particularly vulnerable to political interference and this vulnerability 
is intrinsic to their worth, namely to both raise income and provide a forum for 
good environmental choices. 
 
Globally, environmental taxation has not reached its full potential a century 
after it was first proposed by Pigou.  Environmental taxation is a useful 
instrument for the delivery of environmental policies and the potential to 
facilitate changes in taxation policies. They may become a substitute for other 
taxes, particularly in areas connected with energy, transport and natural 
resources.  The Mirrlees Review was a major step in the direction of a 
progressive, neutral tax system that included environmental taxes within a 
general umbrella of tax reform, but it has not been implemented. This is a 
missed opportunity as the recent findings of similar Australian and New 
Zealand tax reviews have shown:  
 
                                              
75 House of Commons: Environmental Audit Committee Sixth Report Budget and 
Environmental Taxes 2010-212 Col. 1 HC 878 (7th July 2011). 
76 IFS, The IFS Green Budget February 2012, p. 168. 
77 See: Claudia Dias Soares, “Earmarking revenue from environmentally related taxes” in 
Janet E Milne and Mikael Skou Andersen eds., Handbook of Research on Environmental 
Taxation Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2014 pp. 114-5. 
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… a shift towards consistent pricing of greenhouse gas emissions and 
the replacement of the current taxes on petrol and diesel with a 
national system of congestion charging.78 
 
The future  success of environmental taxation depends on the full recognition 
of its potential to offer a “double dividend” providing  a source of revenue as 
well as environmental protection, though as the Mirrlees Review points out “ it 
is not necessary for taxes on pollution to be welfare improving”.  There remain 
some sceptical views that environmental taxes may increase the price of 
goods consumed somewhere in the economy, which will have a distorting 
effect on the use of such taxes. However, it is possible to redesign the tax 
system to lessen this effect with differential tax rates being used and the 
share of environmental taxation adjusted accordingly, but this does not 
guarantee an outcome. Environmental taxation requires sound policy 
making79 and more research of the implications for environmental taxation 
and how they may work. It is necessary for issues such as fairness and equity 
and the regressive or progressive nature of a tax to be more transparently 
made out and explained. Tax law offers many levels of analysis, but the 
relative merits of different approaches to taxation are, with limited exceptions, 
under- valued.80 
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